Posts Tagged ‘election audits’

New York State’s post-election audits provide little confidence in close contests.

Thursday, December 30th, 2010

This post is in response to a December 29, 2010 editorial in the Times-Union, “Time to fix this election law” by Jay Jochnowitz, Editorial page editor.

“Today’s editorial: When an election is as close as the one in the 7th Senate District was, a recount should be automatic, not left to the judges’ discretion.” http://blog.timesunion.com/opinion/time-to-fix-this-election-law/8371/#comment-2671
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Great editorial by Jay Jochnowitz. The Board of Elections, via its own regulations on post-election auditing, gave away its authority to ensure accurate election outcomes by:

1. requiring every county separately audit a flat 3% rate of “machines” that each county selects;

2. neglecting to require the counties to publicly post, or to submit to the Board, election results broken out by precinct (or district) and by absentee and Election Day (thus allowing unaudited district tallies to be manipulated to match any fraudulent overall tally and the audits be not publicly verifiable. In auditing any field, the data needs to be committed prior to the audit);

3. exempting all absentee ballots from any manual checks;

4. not allowing the public to observe the audits, unless appointed by a candidate (unlike most other states);

5. not requiring the counties to reveal their ballot security procedures or allow the public to verify or assist with verification of the security of ballots; and

6. not requiring any jurisdiction-wide reconciliation of the printed ballots to detect any possible ballot substitutions or ballot box stuffing.

The Board of Elections could work with the State Legislature to use the same amount of resources more efficiently and effectively by

1. allowing the audit units to be smaller units than machines (such as districts) as long as the unit tallies are publicly reported prior to the random selections, and

2. allowing risk-limiting audits rather than requiring 3% flat rate audits,

3. requiring random selections from *all* the ballots (reported tallies) that sum to the overall total, and

4. allowing random selections weighted by the upper margin error bounds within each publicly reported tally, rather than requiring a uniform selection probability.

The state legislature needs to change a few laws to enable the Board to exercise more flexibility and use resources more efficiently and effectively, and the Board of Elections needs to work with a mathematician who understands how to conduct risk-limiting post-election audits so that the sample size automatically goes to 100% when needed to limit the risk of certifying incorrect election outcomes.

Jay correctly notes that a 3% sample of “machines”, excluding all absentee ballots from examination, allows a small number of precincts or districts tallies or absentee ballots to be manipulated to change the outcome of a very close contest like the Long Island NYS Senate race, or several other NYS contests in November 2010.

New York State’s current post-election audit procedures provide virtually no public confidence in any close contests.

Fundamentals of Publicly Verifying Election Outcome Accuracy

Thursday, September 9th, 2010

Kathy Dopp, MS Mathematics, Ph.D. Student
kathy dot dopp at gmail dot com
August 28, 2010

I developed this with the United States in mind, but have tried to make it general to verifying the accuracy of electoral outcomes obtained by electronic tallies of paper ballots. All of the following conditions are necessary to avoid certifying incorrect election outcomes:

  1. Independently-auditable voting systems, i.e. voter-marked paper ballots, not electronic ballots
  2. Public observation of, and participation in (a) manual counts or audits and (b) secure handling, storage and transportation procedures for electoral records, including ballots.
  3. Initially manually counting all ballots or, at a minimum, counting of adequate vote tallies (audit units) to limit the risk of certifying any incorrect initial election outcome by detecting miscount even when the fewest audit units that could cause an incorrect outcome are miscounted. (If calculations assume maximum margin error within each audit unit is less than its upper margin error bound, then candidates may select discretionary units for manual auditing in addition to the random sample.) If not initially manually counting all ballots:
    • Public reporting of all vote tallies (audit units) used to tally overall election results prior to randomly selecting a sample for auditing
    • Publicly-verifiably fair random probability selection methods (Calandrino, Halderman, & Felten, In defense of pseudorandom sample selection, Woodrow Wilson School of Public and International Affairs. 2007), preferably weighted by within audit unit upper margin error bounds rather than by a uniform sampling distribution
    • Prohibiting ballot and electoral record access between the time of random selections and manual audits
    • Expansion of the sample size, perhaps to a full recount, or certification of the election using an algorithm based on the premises of the sampling method, treating any missing paper ballots as discrepancies when deciding whether to expand or certify
  4. Polling place and jurisdiction-wide reconciliation of printed, used, unused, and spoiled ballots with absentee ballot, polling place and other electoral records
  5. Timely public access to electoral records necessary to evaluate the accuracy and integrity of reconciliation and manual counting or auditing processes
  6. Voter intent as the standard for manually counting ballots
  7. Public reporting of any discrepancies found during the manual count or audit, using manual counts to correct any initial reported results
  8. Completion of the manual count or audit prior to certifying election results

Does the state you live in follow all these procedures?

Why are each of these conditions necessary to verify election outcome accuracy?

An example of how elections can be stolen if each of the 12 conditions alone is missing. (Dozens of additional ways to rig elections exist when more than one condition is missing.)

1. There are at least four ways for a single insider to rig digital recording electronic (DRE) voting machines in an entire county with a few seconds access using an inexpensive memory stick, in a way that pre-election testing could not detect. (Are Your Votes Really Counted? Testing the Security of Real-world Electronic Voting Systems, D. Balzarotti, G. Banks, M. Cova, V. Felmetsger, R. Kemmerer, W. Robertson, F. Valeur, and G. Vigna, in Proceedings of the International Symposium on Software Testing and Analysis, Seattle, WA July 2008.) http://www.cs.ucsb.edu/~seclab/projects/voting/

2. (a) Miscount, misreport or under-report discrepancies found during manual counting (b) Substitute, lose, tamper with, or spoil ballots or stuff ballot boxes

3. Rig close elections by hiding miscount in the smallest number of precincts possible to avoid detection by a small fixed-rate audit, or use sham audit procedures that never check the accuracy of reported vote tallies

a. Misreport all audit unit tallies that were not previously randomly selected for auditing

b. Sampling can be fixed to audit only tallies that will match reported tallies (as in OH 2004)

c. Tamper with ballots selected for auditing between the time of the random selection and the audit

d. Failure to properly analyze the amount of errors or missing ballots can cause election certification of incorrect election outcomes despite evidence in the sample

4. Lack of polling-place reconciliation covers up polling place ballot box stuffing or ballot substitution and lack of jurisdiction-wide reconciliation covers up ballot box stuffing or ballot substitution when mail-in voting or early voting are allowed

5. Lack of public access to records permits fictitious numbers to be reported during reconciliation, covering up certain types of ballot substitution, fraudulent vote reporting and ballot box stuffing

6. If systematic errors in ballot design, or voter understanding are not identified in the audit process, it could result in certification of an incorrect result. Voter ballot marking errors or poll workers misinforming voters on how to fill out ballots may cause an outcome different than desired by voters

7. If all discrepancies are not reported and recognized as such, many may be explained away as happening as the result of a mistake or error in one place even though error in one place can be an indicator that similar mistakes or errors may exist elsewhere.

8. If the election is certified prior to completing the audit, there may be no legal recourse to remove a person from office that was not elected by voters.

Voter Rights Removed by Instant Runoff Voting

Saturday, April 24th, 2010

Instant runoff voting and single transferable voting (IRV/STV) are the only alternative voting methods that fail more of Arrow’s Fairness criteria than plurality voting does because increasing the number of votes for a candidate may cause that candidate to lose, whereas otherwise the candidate would have won!

1. IRV/STV remove the right cast a vote with a positive effect on a candidate’s chances of winning because it is non-monotonic (increasing the number of votes for a candidate may cause that candidate to lose, whereas the candidate otherwise would have won). See this video:
Instant Runoff Voting – Every Vote Counts!
http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=fOwDyGCaOFM&feature=related

2. IRV/STV remove the right to participate in the final decision of who wins the election by eliminating voters’ ballots prior to the final counting round. The more candidates, the more voters are eliminated prior to the final counting round.

3. IRV/STV remove the right to have one’s votes counted equally and fairly with all other voters’ votes because only voters supporting the least popular candidates as their 1st choice are assured of having their 2nd choice candidate counted when their 1st choice candidate looses.

4. In comparison with top‐two runoff elections, IRV/STV remove the right to elect majority winners. San Francisco had to eliminate its legal right to elect majority winners when it adopted IRV/STV because STV routinely elects winners with far less than 50% of the votes.

5. IRV/STV remove the right to a transparent, verifiable election process with a decentralized, simple counting process that can be easily manually counted and audited.

6. IRV/STV removes the right to have an economical election process.

7. IRV/STV removes the right to change one’s mind between the primary and general election and to have time to get to know the candidates.

8. Violates civil rights of already disenfranchised groups. See Instant Runoff Voting – Voting Civil Rights
http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=qvwXzQyGgQM&feature=channel

The Mayor of San Francisco wants to get rid of Instant Runoff Voting

A well‐funded misnomered group called Fair Vote, led by Rob Richie, has ties to an Internet voting software company and funds misleading IRV/STV promotional ad campaigns in the United States. Because IRV/STV gives voters of the least popular candidates the most power to decide which candidates are eliminated, counting their 2nd choices first, IRV/STV tend to elect extreme right or extreme left candidates, eliminating centrist majority-favorites. Many other alternative, fair, proportional electoral methods are available that preserve voter rights, precinct count-ability, and election transparency including approval and party list methods. This “reform” threatens the integrity, accuracy, and fairness of US elections.

For more information see http://www.instantrunoffvoting.us or http://electionmathematics.org or http://rangevoting.org